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LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY IN JAPAN IN
COMPARISON WITH EUROPE AND THE U.S.*
Toshiaki TACHIBANAKI
Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606, Japan
1. Introduction
There is a common understanding outside of Japan that the Japanese
labour market is more flexible than those of the other industrialized nations,
and that this flexibility has facilitated to lower the rate of unemployment and
to provide a better performance of the macroeconomy in general. Fig. 1 is
presented to show that the rate of unemployment in Japan has not changed
atalldespite a big drop in the GDP in comparison with the other
industrialized countries. The reduction in employment also was not so great.
Almost all other countries show that a drop in GDP is accompanied by a
drop in employment and thus by an increase in unemployment, although the
degrees are varied by countries. These resultsin Japan are somewhat
mysterious but deserve a serious investigation. This paper attempts to
examine, on the basis of studies by both Japanese and non-Japanese, whether
flexibility is the real story. The paper also attempts to seek the reasons for
this flexibility, if any, with particular emphasis on a comparison between the
Japanese economy and the economies of other industrialized nations, and the
reasons for the very minor change in the rate of employment.
Obviously, it is impossible to cover all the dimensions of labour market
flexibility. This paper concentrates on a few subjects such as (1) labour
adjustment, (2) wages and labour demand, (3) labour cost, (4) labour supply,
(5) labour mobility, (6) seriousness of unemployment, and others.
It might be useful to summarize the reasons for the relatively better
performance in the Japanese labour market (especially the low rate of
unemployment) during the 1970s and the early 1980s. First, there was no
strong pressure of labour supply by young people and female workers. The
*An earlier version of this paper benelited much from extremely useful and constructive
advices given by two discussants at the International Seminar on Macroeconomics, held at
Namur in Belgium, Richard Layard and Jacques Mairesse. The author is very grateful to them
who improved the quality of this paper substantially. Other participants, namely Martin Baily,
William Branson, Martin Feldstein, Robert Gordon, Lawrence Summers and Jean Waelbroek
gave me useful comments. Comments by Masahiko Aoki, Tatsuo Hatta, Yoko Sano and
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Fig. 1. The movement of GDP, the number of employed people and the rate of unemployment,
where GDP, ------the number of employed people and ---= the rate of unem-
ployment. The movement of GDP and the number of employed people is measured by the
annual rate of change. The movement of the rate of unemployment is measured by the difference
between the average rate of unemployment in the sample and the respective year's rate of
unemployment. When the rate of unemployment in this graph moves in a parallel motion with
GDP or the number of employment, it implies that when GDP or employment increases (or
decreases), unemployment decreases (or increases). Source:Higuchi, Seike and Hayami (1986)
(Original Source:International Statistics, Bank of Japan).
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proportion of the working population of youth has been somewhat declining
due largely to both a decrease in the youth population and an increase in the
enrollment rate for higher education. The female labour force participation
rate had been in a decreasing trend for a long time, although quite recently it
is somewhat increasing. Secondly, the pressure of foreign workerswas almost
negligible, unlike the U.S. and Europe where internationally immigrated
workers became one of the main sources for unemployment, especially in
Europe. Thirdly, the growth rate of unemployment in the tertiary sectorwas
considerably high, and it absorbed a large number of the work-force in
contrast to a minor decrease in employment in manufacturing industries.
During the past period of rapid economic growth, the manufacturing sector
had absorbed an incredibly large number of workers from the ruralareas,
where people were predominantly engaged in agriculture. It isno exagger-
ation to say that the regional and industrial mobility of workerswas
extremely high. Fourth, the proportion of temporary employees such as part-
time workers, employment with fixed durations and others (avery rough
estimate is about 30 percent of the total non-agricultural labour force) and of
self-employed workers including family workers (about 30 percent) has been
considerably high. As a result, the proportion of permanent employees has
been about 40 percent. The high share of temporary employees suggests that
employment may fluctuate rather easily, while the high share of self-employed
workers implies that those people are rarely unemployed unless they change
their labour force status. Fifth, the effect of discouraged workers contributed
significantly. Sixth, the movement of labour productivity, working hours
and wages was quite flexible. This point was emphasized by Gordon (1982),
Hamada and Kurosaka (1986), and others. Seventh, union power and
'search intensity' in terms of both the generosity of unemployment compensa-
tion and strictness of the unemployment protection laws were weak. See
Gordon (1982) about conflict avoidance as a social norm and the Shuntö
(the annual spring offensive) in union power, and Shimada, Hosokawa and
Seike (1981) and Tachibanaki (1984b) who found a minor disincentive effect
of unemployment compensation. See also Layard and Nickell (1986) about
its quantitative assessment. Eighth, several forms of labour adjustment to
minimize the number of discharges (or layoffs) are adopted by Japanese firms
and encouraged by the government. Ninth, the share of non-wage labour
costs within the total labour cost has been relatively small. This is related to
the relatively poor social security system in Japan at least in comparison
with Europe. Several of the above arguments are examined carefully in this
paper.
2. Labour adjustment
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considerable number of efforts have been made in Japan to estimatethe
labour demand functions, in particular the labour adjustment functions.The
main purpose of these studies is to estimate the degree of responsivenessor
the speed of adjustment to labour demand. Some of the resultsare reviewed
in comparison with the other countries.
A relatively simple labour demand function (1) isa starting point, which
was originated by Brechling (1965), Ball and Cyr (1966), Nadiri (1968) and
others.
lnN,lnN1_1=A(lnN'lnN1_1), (1)
where N is the employment at time t, N' is the desired level of employment
and 2 is the adjustment coefficient. This is a partial adjustment model. When
we take account of adjustment costs such as hiring, training and firing costs,
which were considered by Rosen (1968), Ehrenberg (1971) and Nadiriand
Rosen (1974), the adjustment model with fixed costs is obtained.
Let us summarize the estimated speed of adjustment in employment
briefly. In the United States those coefficientsare 0.5-0.6 by Soligo (1966),
0.59 by Brechling and O'Brien (1967), 0.643 by Nadiri (1968) and 0.4by
Shinozuka and Ishihara (1977), respectively. In the United Kingdomthe
coefficients are 0.307 by Brechling (1965), 0.185 by Ball and Cyr (1966) and
0.22 by Brechling and Cyr (1967), respectively. The Japanese coefficientsare
0.1 by Muramatsu (1983) and 0.04-0.08 by Shinozuka and Ishihara (1977),
respectively. It is found that the Japanese speed of adjustment is considerably
slower than those in the U.K. or the U.S. Thus, itmay be concluded that
the Japanese response to labour demand isvery slow by the international
standard.
Why has the Japanese speed of adjustment been slower? Labour inputhas
been regarded as a quasi-fixed factor of production. Thismay be interpreted
by the notion of specific human capital and of hiring and training fixedcosts.
A firm invests in a worker's human capital in orderto achieve a higher
expected marginal value product over his expected future working lifetimein
the firm. The higher such an investment is, the less adjustment thereis in
labour.
When the labour inputs are distinguished between employment andman-
hours (employment times working hours),the speedof adjustmentis
considerably different between them. As Harnermesh (1965) concludes,in
general the adjustment of employment is slower than that of workinghours,
although there are minor exceptions such as Hart and McGregor (1982)for
West Germany and Briscoe and Peel (1975) for the U.K. Japan isnot an
exception to this general rule, as Muramatsu (1983) and Shinozuka (1980)
have shown. Shinozuka (1980), for example, found thatthe speed of
adjustment of employment was 0.10 for firms withmore than 30 employees120 T Tachibanaki, Labour market flexibility in Japan, Europe and U.S.
and 0.30 for firms with 5-29 employees, while the speed of adjustment of
hours was 0.37 for firms with more than 30 employees and 0.49 for firms
with 5-29 employees. Shinozuka (1986) confirmed those findings. They
attribute this to the following factors:first, higher fixed costs of hiring,
training and discharge than those of overtime premiums associated with a
change in working hours are normal. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that
most of the labour adjustments in Japan were made through the change in
working hours and the cut in new hires to a lesser extent, as will be shown
later.Secondly, Japanese firmsprefer internal work forces rather than
external work forces when they adjust labour input. For example, re-
allocation or transfer of workers to other establishments within a firm or to
other sections within an establishment are frequently used, and also labour
hoarding is quite common. In other words, the internal labour market
dominates the external labour market.
Several supplementary notes are provided about labour adjustment in
Japan. First, there is a considerable gap between men and women with
respect to the speed of adjustment. Nakamura (1983, 1984) finds that the
coefficient for women is much higher than that for men when the speed of
adjustment in employment is investigated. Shinozuka (1980) obtained a
similar result to Nakamura's, but proposed another valuable finding: when
the speed of adjustment in employment is estimated for large firms and small
firms separately, the female coefficient is higher than the male coefficient at
large firms, while the opposite result is observed at small firms. When we
combine the two sexes, the speed is quicker at small firms than large firms.
She suggests, then, that the first instrument is adjustment by working hours,
the second isthe use (or discharge) of temporary or part-time female
workers, the third is separation of female regular employees and the final is
discharge of male regular workers as the order of priority when labour
adjustment at large firms takes place. Results for small firms are less clear in
determining such an order since almost the same values of the adjustment
coefficients were obtained when man-hours were used instead of employment.
Secondly, a non-negligible difference is observed by industries in Japan,
unlike the U.S. [See Hamermesh (1976) for the U.S.] Seike (1985), Muramatsu
(1986) and others conclude that the speed of adjustment in light industries
was quicker than in heavy industries. One of the reasons is that technology
in heavy industries is more capital intensive, and thus the fixity of labour
input is higher.
Thirdly, labour adjustment in employment is made through a cut (or an
increase) in new hires rather than a change in current stock (discharge or
layoff) of workers. Fig. 2 shows that a considerable rate of fluctuation in new
hires is observed. This is in particular true in manufacturing industries. This
does not necessarily imply, of course, that there are no discharges or layoffs.
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Fig. 2. Time series change in the rate of new hires and separations.
Source:Employment Trend, Ministry of labour.
than ten percent of its man-hours inresponse to a fall in demand or output,
the probability of adopting discharge is positive. A dismissal of workersby
designation is the final step, probably becauseno rule, such as for example
seniority rule, for determining who is dismissed is prepared. The firststep is
to send workers (normally older workers) to subsidiary companiesor to
firms in the same group (say in the ex-zaibatsu Mitsubishigroup, for
example). The second step isto call voluntary quits by offering some
premiums. Finally, dismissals come.
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Finally, many studies suggest that the speed of labour adjustment by
employment has been increasing in the past years, especially after the two oil
crises. One reason is that Japanese firms do not have high expectations for
the recurrence of a rapid growth of the economy as in the past. In other
words, they are somewhat pessimistic about the future. Thus, they tend to
minimize the number of employees as much as possible. Secondly, it may be
possible that both employers and employees do not have strong hesitations
in applying a drastic method such as adjustment by employment in recent
years.
Tables 1 and 2 are presented to confirm some of the above propositions
from a different angle. The estimated standard deviations in table 1 suggest
that Japan shows the highest deviation in working hours and the lowest in
employment among the major industrialized nations. Working hours are
much more flexible than employment.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that the change in total working hours
is strongly affected by the change in overtime hours. Table 2 shows a
decomposition of the change in total working hours into the change in
regular hours and the change in overtime hours. The table clearly indicates
that the contribution of overtime hours is as strong as the contribution of
Table I
Estimated standard deviations of output, employment, working hours and real wage per
hour.
(A) signifies that the standard deviations are calculated for the rate of change in each
index of the variable for 1970-83, while(B)signifies that standard deviations are
calculated for log-transformed variables which are de-trended for 1964-83. The numbers
in parentheses are the values for non-trended variables. Thus, (A) and(B)are not
comparable.
Source:Higuchi, Seike and Hayarni (1986) and Ohtake (1986) (Originalsources:






Japan 6.509 2.089 1.903
U.S. 6.963 4.376 1.447
U.K. 4.635 2.409 1.508
W. Germany 4.014 2.325 1.509
France 5.368 0.728
(B)
Japan 0.147 0.048 (0.048) 0.111 (0.343)
U.S. 0.062 0.052 (0.050) 0.038 (0.045)
U.K. 0.045 0.056 (0.159) 0.052 (0.121)
W. Germany 0.070 0.062 (0.089) 0.057 (0.192)
France 0.069 0.037 (0.083) 0.036 (0.231)T Tachibanaki, Labour market flexibility in Japan, Europe and U.s. 123
Table 2
Decomposition of the change in total working hours into the change in
regular hours and the change in overtime hours (% per year).
Source:Monthly Labour Statistics,annual series, Ministry of Labour.
regular hours. The overtime premium is 25 percent in Japan as well as the
U.K. and West Germany, while it is 50 percent in the U.S. Thus, Japan does
not provide firms with an extra incentive to utilize overtime hours by the
international standard. The mutual interests of both employers (coping with
a fluctuation in demand and output smoothly) and employees (the desire to
obtain higher wages by overtime hours and corporate loyalty to firms) may
be another reason.
It is important to add the cost factor. The Ministry of Labour (1986)
conducted a valuable study which compared the cost between a new hire and
overtime hours by a currently employed person. It concluded that the cost to
a firm for an additional new hire would be the same as the cost for overtime
hours by a currently employed person if the overtime premium rate were
62.9 percent. In view of the current premium 25 percent, no firms would hire
new employees instead of utilizing overtime hours. Interestingly, the break-
even premium rate is 74.4 percent for larger firms (more than 500 em-
ployees), 61.0 percent for medium-size firms (100-499 employees) and 47.4
percent for smaller firms (30-99 employees), respectively. This is due largely
to the fact that the fixed cost is higher in larger firms than in smaller firms.
This is one of the primary reasons why larger firms are inclined to use
flexible overtime hours rather than changing the numer of employment in
comparison with smaller firms which tend to use flexible employment.
Let us conduct a brief international comparison with respect to the level of
working hours. The total annual working hours and overtime hours in 1983
were 2,152 and 202 (the rate of overtime hours to total hours, 9.39 percent)
in Japan, 1,898 and 156 (8.22 percent) in the U.s., 1,938 and 140 (7.22
percent) in the U.K., 1,622 and 45 (2.77 percent) in Italy, 1,613 and 78 (4.84
percent) in West Germany and 1,657 and 78 (4.71 percent) in France. Both
the total working hours and the overtime hours (including the rate of
overtime hours) are the longest in Japan among the six countries. The
Total hours Regular hours Overtime hours
1955-1960 0.9 0.3 0.5
1960-1965 -1.1 -0.5 -0.5
1965-1970 -0.5 -0.7 0.1
1970-1973 -0.8 -0.6 -0.2
1973-1976 -1.3 -0.6 -0.7
1976-1980 0.2 -0.1 0.3
1980-1985 -0.1 -0.2 0.1124 TTachibanaki, Labour market flexibility in Japan, Europe and U.S.
importance of overtime hours in Japan isrecognized further by this
international comparison.
A higher fluctuation in working hours is confirmed internationally by table
1. As noted before, Japan shows the highest standard deviation in working
hours and the lowest in employment among the major industrial nations
despite very high fluctuations in output. When we use the total man-hours,
the story is considerably different since Japan shows the lowest fluctuation.
In sum, a very high adjustment by working hours and a low adjustment by
employment are the Japanese ways of labour adjustment. The U.S. is the
other extreme, namely a high adjustment by employment and a low
adjustment by working hours. Europe stays between the two extremes.
Which is more desirable as an adjustment policy? If a national consensus
that to keep the rate of unemployment as low as possible as the first national
goal of the economic policy is supported universally, the Japanese way of
labour adjustment is certainly desirable. However, non-negligible costs such
as, for example, inflation, inefficient management of firms due to excess
employment, profit squeeze or foreign trade conflict must be paid to achieve
this goal. I do not believe, therefore, that the Japanese way of labour
adjustment can be recommended to the other industrialized nations easily. I
evaluate the U.S. temporary layoffs positively, as will be argued later. Each
country has its own preference which must be assessed highly.
3. Flexible wage rates and labour demand
There is a common understanding internationally that Japanese wages
(both nominal and real) are flexible, and that this flexibility has helped the
Japanese economy to perform relatively well. This section intends to re-
examine this issue based on a large number of studies.
Japanese economists were ignorant of this aspect, namely flexibility of
wages. It is ironic that foreign observers opened Japanese economists' eyes to
this issue. Representatively, we can name Sacks (1979, 1983), Branson and
Rotemberg (1980), Gordon (1982), Grubb, Jackman and Layard (1983), and
others. Many studies, except for perhaps Sacks, support the observation that
flexibility of real wages in Japan is considerably high, and thus it has helped
to lead to a better performance. It is important to consider two issues
separately. The firstis to investigatee whether the real wage isflexible,
statistically speaking. Secondly, provided that this flexibility is supported
empirically, isit possible to propose that this flexibility has raised labour
demand, and thus lowered unemployment?
3.1. Statistical wage flexibility
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lot of investigations were performed to re-examine whether real wages in
Japan are flexible. Many studies such as Yoshitomi (1981), Shinkai (1982),
Komiya and Yasui (1984), Mizuno (1985), OCED (1985), Hashimoto and
Raisian (1985), Koshiro (1986), except for perhaps Ohtake (1986), support
Gordon's view, namely that the Japanese real wages are more flexible than
the other industrialized nations, although various reasons are provided by
different authors to support it.
Gordon (1982) basically attributed the flexibility to 'bonus' payments paid
twice a year. Mizuno (1985), however, emphasizes that not only bonus
payments but also basic wages (total wage earnings minus bonus payments)
are flexible. His point is that the proportion of bonus payments to total wage
earnings is at most 25 percent, and it is declining constantly. Thus, if flexi-
bility of total wage payments is observed statistically, its main cause is not
flexibility of the bonuses but of the monthly wages. He actually estimated
that the relative contribution of flexibility of the bonus payments to the flexi-
bility of the total wage payments was about 10 percent during the period of
1960-83. The main source for the big contribution of the fluctuation of
monthly wages is wage payments by overtime hours, due partly to overtime
premiums.
Bonuses are explained very briefly. In 1983, 97.9 percent of firms paid
bonuses, and 99.3 percent of all employees received some amount of bonuses.
Thus, they are well-established and systematic payments. About 32.0 percent
of all firms say that they determine the total amount of bonus payments on
the basis of firms' performances such as sales, value-added, and profits.
Smaller firms stress the consideration of performances and profits more than
larger firms. The majority of Japanese firms, especially larger firms, regard
bonuses as quasi-regular wage payments rather than asprofit-sharing.
Koshiro (1986) supports this view in his econometric work. Thus, although
the bonus payments in Japan have a profit-sharing aspect in terms of
Weitzman (1984),itis not a pure profit-sharing scheme. This does not
necessarily imply, however, that the amount of bonuses is fixed. It is fairly
varied in response to the firms'business conditions, as many authors
suggested. See Hashimoto (1979), Tachibanaki (1982) and Freeman and
Weitzman (1986).
An interesting aspect about bonuses is how to allocate the total amount of
bonus payments to individual employees. About 70 percent of firms say that
they take account of the individual employee's performance. Only about 30
percent of firms pay the equal amount (say, two or three months' regular
wages) to all employees regardless of the employee's performance. What are
the criteria for determining each person's performance? The rate of absence,
contribution to a firm, skill, responsibility and leadership as a supervisor,
tenure at a firm, and etc. Thus, bonuses are used by firms as an incentive
payment to a certain extent. This, however, depends upon industries, and the126 T. Tachibanaki, Labour market flexibility in Japan, Europe and U.S.
incentive aspect should not be overemphasized since the amount determined
by it is considerably small.
Another method for estimating the degree of flexibility of wage payment is
to rely upon the Phillips curve approach, which Grubb, Jackman and Layard
(1983) have adopted. If a change in the wage rate was sensitive to the labour
market condition (say, the rate of unemployment), it would be concluded
that flexibility of the wage determination is high. This method is likely to
overestimate the degree of flexibility if an economy does not have a sizeable
movement in the rate of unemployment. It is possible that the Japanese
flexibility has been somewhat overestimated because of the almost constant
rate of unemployment. Thus, the OECD study (1985) which showed that
Japanese real wage rigidity was the lowest among the OECD countries is
somewhat dubious. The method utilized a change in the unemployment rate
as well as a change in the consumer prices. Related to this, it is noted that
the work by Hamada and Kurosaka (1984), who estimated the Okun's
coefficientten times higher in Japan than intheU.S., was accepted
unfavourably not only by a non-Japanese, Mairesse (1984), but also by several
Japanese economists. An unbiased estimation of the Okun's coefficient
requires a certain degree of fluctuation in the rate of unemployment. In sum,
a method for estimating the flexibility of wages which utilizes a change in the
rate of unemployment in estimating wage or price equations (say, the Phillips
curve approach) needs careful interpretations when the rate of unemployment
does not fluctuate sufficiently, like Japan's case.
It is possible to conclude based on a large number of studies, in particular
pure statistical studies which do not use the Phillips curve approach, that
wages (both nominal and real) in Japan are considerably flexible. One
important exception is Ohtake (1986) who found less flexibility when he
considered the de-trended wage figures. He also examined real wages which
are standardized by a change in output. He proposes that a shock in output
(say, the two oil crises) which gives an excessive impact on a change in wages
must be eliminated. Since his argument has a point,itis necessary to
examine it further. However, he does not deny that real wages in Japan are
variable, at least based on the purely statistical evidence.
It is necessary to argue why real wages are flexible. Several economic and
institutional factors, in addition to the bonus payments and flexible working
hours examined before, are suggested here, but a serious discussion is
avoided. (i) Wage contracts are determined largely on a yearly basis in the
framework of the ShuntO, unlike the three-year contract in the U.S. The past
performance of productivity movement, inflation rate, macroeconomic con-
ditions and others, is taken fully into account by both employers and trade
unions at the Shunto. (ii) Several studies, Yoshitomi (1981), Shinaki (1982),
Komiya and Yasui (1984) and others, propose that a change in wages is
strongly affected by a change in terms of trade and productivity. (iii) TradeT. Tachibanaki, Labour market.flexibility in Japan, Europe and U.s. 127
unions are concerned with the assurance of the employment of their
members. When the utility function of trade unions was estimated by
Hayami (1986), a stronger preference of employment rather than wage
increase was found. Thus, it is likely that trade unions are willing to make
the sacrifice of wages in exchange for the assurance of employment. This is a
big contrast with the European experience, especially in the U.K. where the
impact of union powers on wages is fairly strong, as shown by Minford
(1983) and Nickell and Andrews (1983).
Furthermore, the rate of unionization in Japan is fairly low (about 30
percent) by the international standard, and more importantly, the rate is
under a constant decline. For example, see Hamada and Kurosaka (1986).
Not only weak preferences of wage increases by trade unions but also the
low rate of unionization contributed to some of the flexibility of wages. It is
an irony but interesting that both Japan and the U.S., where macroeconomic
performances are relatively better than the European countries, have lower
unionization rates. I argue that the labour side should be able to demand
higher wage payments in view of the fact that the properly measured labour
share within the national income in Japan has declined constantly, and that
some increases in wages in boom industries will encourage a higher domestic
consumption which has a positive effect on reducing the current huge trade
surplus. Labour market flexibility in terms of a cooperative behavior of trade
unions vis-à-vis managements may be regarded as one of the causes for the
current foreign trade surplus. This gives one example of the fact that labour
market flexibility cannot be evaluated always positively.
3.2. Wages and labour demand
A second important issueis the relationship between wages and the
demand for labour. Specifically, is it possible to propose that a flexible wage
system increases employment? The U.S. result was surveyed by Hamermesh
(1976), and a consensus, namely stable and robust wage effects on the
demand for labour, was obtained at least up to 1976. However, some recent
papers by Hall (1975, 1980) have presented unresponsive wages, and Bell and
Freeman (1985) find that flexible wages by industries in the U.S. have not
contributed to employment growth. Thus, even in the U.S., the recent story
may be different from the past. In Europe the result was inconclusive as
surveyed by Nickell (1982). The recent studies, however, tend to support that
there are some clear real wage effects on the demand for labour when
relative material/fuel prices are accounted for. See Nickel! (1984) and Symons
(1985). See also Symons and Layard (1984) about a rigorous international
comparison.
What is the situation in Japan? Muramatsu (1985) gave a useful survey on
the estimation of the real wage elasticities with respect to labour demand.128 T Tachibanaki, Labour market flexibility in Japan, Europe and U.S.
His main conclusion, on the basis of about ten studies in Japan, suggests that
the real wage elasticities are considerably lower than the U.S. elasticities
surveyed by Hamermesh (1976). Under the constant assumption of capital
cost and output, the average elasticities are at most 0.03 for total industries
and 0.15 for manufacturing industries. The effect is smaller in Japan than
in the U.S. Incidentally, the output elasticities in Japan are on the average
0.24 for total industries and 0.44 for manufacturing industries, even after two
years' lag. Those values are smaller than the U.S. values, which are about
0.75-1.00. In sum, it is possible to proclaim that the real wage effects on the
demand for labour in Japan are weak.
Let us summarize this section. Although itis true that the real wage
flexibility is considerably high in Japan, it has not helped to increase the
number of employment. The role of wages as an adjusting factor has been
quite limited. The growth of employment, if any, should be explained by
reasons other than the real wage effect. It should, however, be pointed out
that flexibility prevented current employment from falling to a certain extent,
because the firm's cost condition was saved considerably.
3.3. Other aspects of flexibility related to wages and labour costs
3.3.1. Nenko wages and equality
Japanese wage determination is characterized by the 'nenko' wage system:
the wage rate is determined largely by employees' tenures and ages. See
Tachibanaki (1975, 1982). Every country has a similar system. The only
difference is that the Japanese case is much more apparent than in the other
countries. See fig. 3 which shows a steeper age-earnings profile in Japan.
Several implications of the system for the performance of the labour market
are considered.
First, since the growth rate of wages by tenure and age is high, the wage
level of younger prople is low while it is high among older people. This is,
incidentally, the main reason for the higher unemployment rate by older
people (ages over 55), 4.3 percent in recent years. Curiously, the rate of
unemployment by younger people (ages 15-24) is not so low (about 4.5
percent). This is due largely to factors that arise from the supply side, as
shown by Tachibanaki (1984).
Secondly, the wage distribution among the same age group is quite equal
because of the 'nenko' system, although the wage distribution of total
employees may be quite unequal, because samples of both younger and older
workers are included in the total number of employees. This is obvious
because the wage level of nearly all employees is proportional to their
tenures and ages.Itisalso found that education and occupation are
minor variables to differentiate the wage rate of employees. See TachibanakiT. Tachibanaki, Labour market flexibility in Japan, Europe and U.S. 129
(1975, 1982) and Atoda and Tachibanaki (1986) about it. Those features
provide employees with a feeling of equal treatment by employers. This equal
treatment gives incentives for corporate loyalty and hard-working to em-
ployees, especially workers with lower educational and occupational attain-
ment. I believe that this is one of the reasons why labour productivity has
been high in general.
There must be several questions about this interpretation. For example,
how isthe incentive of educated and skilled workers evaluated? The
American literature emphasizes the incentive of qualified and supervisory
workers who should receive higher wages. See Calvo and Wellisz (1979), and
Rosen (1982), for example. Incentives for qualified workers are not provided
by monetary rewards at least currently in Japan. There is an incentive by
bonus payments, as noted previously. This is still minor, and does not have a
strong impact.
One important problem remains. Does productivity of workers increase in
proportion to the workers' tenure at a firm? Since the 'nenko' system
implicitly assumes that the above is true,itis important to investigate
whether it is empirically supported. Otherwise, firms and/or workers may be
Japan and the U.K. (197576)
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Fig. 3A. Wage growth by age: Japan and the U.K. This graph shows the index of log wages in
comparison with the wage levelat age=21-24.Source:Koike (1981),Skill Formation in
Japan,Yuhikaku, Tokyo (in Japanese) (original sources: Japan,Wage Structure Survey, 1976,
Ministry of Labour, U.K., New Earnings Survey, 1975,Department of Employment).
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Fig. 3B. Wage growth by age: Japan and the U.S. The wage indexes are given in comparison
with the wage level at age=22 where the index value is equal to 100. Those wage indexes are
not the actual wages earned at each wage, but merely show the growth of wages by age. The
graph does not show that the wage levels of college graduates and high school graduates in the
U.S. are the same. It indicates that the growth of wages is almost the same in comparison with
the wage at the age 22 between college graduates and high school graduates.Source:Shimada
(1981), Earnings Structure and Human Investment,Kogakusha, Tokyo (original sources: Japan,
Wage Structure Survey, 1967,Ministry of Labour, U.S.A.,SurveyofEconomic Opportunity, 1966).
paying higher wages than requirements, or receiving lower wages than
contributions. Unfortunately, thereare no rigorous studies which have
investigated the relationship between wages and marginal productivities in
relation to the 'nenko' system. Flexibility due to the 'nenko' system may be
evaluated precisely only when the relationship is made clear empirically.
Another question may be posed: several studies, for example Klau and
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the highest in Japan among the OECD countries. They evaluate this as
flexibility of the wage structure. This may be inconsistent with the equal
wage distribution as proposed previously. I find that a part of the large inter-
industry wage differentials should be explained by the difference in age and
sex compositions of employees in each industry. Thus, the highest inter-
industry wage differentials ought to be discounted to a certain extent. I do
not deny, however, that some degree of inter-industry wage differentials due
to the difference in productivities in industries contributes to the flexibility of
wage payments to a limited extent in Japan.
3.3.2. Minimum wage law
Minimum wage law specifies that the minimum wage should be deter-
mined by each prefecture. Since the economic condition is considerably
different by regions, such a decentralized system can be evaluated positively
as flexibility. Moreover, the minimum wage law is not obeyed strictly by
employers, and the penalty is almost non-existent. In sum, it is hard to
believe that the minimum wage law has been an obstacle to hire new
employees. This is contrary to American or European experiences in which
some adverse effects are often mentioned.
3.3.3. Malefemale wage differentials
Wage differentials between men and women are reviewed. Several studies,
for example Tachibanaki (1975), and Kawashima and Tachibanaki (1986),
conclude that the most eminent variable which explains wage differentials is
sex (malefemale differences). A large part of malefemale wage differentials
are discriminations against women in wage payment and promotion. They
are not receiving the payments that correspond to their contributions to
firms. About one-third of the labour force is women currently. Firms have
benefited from lower wage payment for women considerably since it has
saved labour costs. Although this is not flexibility, it is an important element
which has helped Japanese firms in cost performance. It is anticipated that
the recently enforced equal employment and treatment act for men and
women will help women, but hurt firms to a certain extent.
3.3.4. Non-wage labour costs
It is well documented that Europe suffers from a heavy burden of non-
wage labour costs, in particular statutory social security contributions to
health and pension programmes. This heavy burden has induced labour cost
rigidity to firms, and is supposed to be one of the most important reasons for
the high unemployment rate in Europe. This issue must be argued in relation
to various aspects such as the problem of the incidence of the employer's
contribution to social security schemes, fixed labour costs and others. We
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Here, only a brief comment on Japan is made with respect to non-wage
labour costs.
Itis said that Japan and the U.S. are two countries among the in-
dustrialized nations where the low rate of non-wage labour costs has
contributed to a better performance of employment. I understand that the
U.S. has a national consensus that services such as medical care and pension
programmes shouldbearrangedprivately.Statutorysocialsecurity
programmes organized by public authorities do not have a great share. This
is the main reason why the U.S. shows a low rate of non-wage labour costs.
Japan is somewhat different. In principle, Japan wanted to adopt the
welfare state in the European sense about twenty years ago. The government
modified the social security system completely, by raising the amount of
public pension payment and medical expenditure considerably. It was proud
of having achieved the European standard with respect to the amount of per
capita pension and medical payment. This achievement, however, was not
supported by a rigorous budgetary background. The aggregate pension and
medical payment was very low because the proportion of retirees to the total
population was quite low at the time. Since the growth rate of the economy
was quite high, huge revenues from both general taxes and social security
contributions could be collected without necessarily assigning high rates of
social security contribution both to employers and employees. In sum, the
government wanted to introduce the notion of a welfare state only on the
payment side without a sound budgetary or actuarial calculation. This was a
mistake some twenty years ago. Thus, firms were not asked to pay a
sufficient amount of social security contributions in the past. This is the main
reason why the statutory employer's contribution had been lower in Japan.
Although sympathy for the government is possible because of the unantici-
pated stagflations after the two oil crises, the mistake is serious. It is no
longer possible to enjoy such low non-wage labour costs in the future since
the share of non-wage labour costs is in an increasing trend.
4. Labour supply
There is a widespread belief that flexible labour force participation is quite
effective in adjusting labour supply. Specifically, the labour supply is in-
creased when an economy is in boom, while it is decreased in a recession.
Ono (1981) and Hamada and Kurosaka (1986) are the representative
examples who propose that this flexibility helped to lower the number of
unemployed people. This notion had been already recognized by many
writers in Japan, and those workers are called 'discouraged workers', who
lose their desire to seek jobs and are forced to retire from the labour market.
A large number of female married employees are likely targets. Discouraged
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'marginalworkers'. Nurkse (1953)calledit'disguisedunemployment'.
Although the exact meanings are different, they all indicate the discouraged
effect.
Three methodologies are possible to verify the existence of discouraged
workers. First, the number of discouraged workers may be estimated directly
through various published labour force surveys. Secondly, average flow rates
and transition probabilities among three states, namely (i) employment, (ii)
unemployment and (iii) not-in-labour force, may be examined and compared
with the movement of business cycles. Thirdly, the rate of labour force
participation can be examined for time-series data. The representative studies
are as follows. Ono (1981) for the first method, Mizuno (1983) for the second,
and Shimada and Higuchi (1985) for the third.
Ono (1981) conducted an interesting comparative work between Japan and
the U.S. in which he estimated the number of discouraged workers. 8.9
percent were discouraged among people who were not in the labour force in
Japan in 1978, while only 1.4 percent were discouraged in the U.S. The
official unemployment rate was 2.2 percent in Japan, while it was 6.0 percent
in the U.S. in the same year. The result suggests that it is quite misleading to
rely on theofficial rate of unemployment to argue the labour market
condition, at least in Japan, in view of the large number of discouraged
workers.
Higuchi, Seike and Hayami (1986) performed a valuable comparative study
of the average flow rates and transition probabilities between Japan and the
U.S. from 1970 to 1982. They concluded that several transition probabilities
such as from not-in-labour force to unemployment, from unemployment to
employment and from employment to unemployment are much more sen-
sitive to business cycles in the U.S. than in Japan. In other words, the
several American transition probabilities fluctuate more significantly than
the Japanese ones, as Fig. 4 shows. It is noted, however, some transition
probabilities such as from employment to not-in-labour force have similar
movements in both Japan and the U.S.
Shimada and Higuchi (1985) presented a very high rate of decrease in the
labour force participation rates by female workers during a fall in labour
demand until the early 1970s, by estimating the labour force participation
equation econometrically. This again suggests clear evidence of the dis-
couraged worker effect until the early 1970s.
Although these studies mentioned above support a view that the effect of
discouraged workers has been considerable, and that this is in particular
serious among female workers, some of the studies suggest that the effect is
becoming weaker and weaker quite recently, and a new phenomenon,
'involuntary' part-time workers, has appeared.
One of the most important findings based on the study of Higuchi, Seike
and Hayami (1986) is that the rate of staying in the labout force after beingFig. 4. Time series movements of several transition probabilities in Japan and the U.S.
'e' stands for employment, 'u' for unemployment and 'n' for not-in-labour force. Thus, the
solid line shows, for example, the transition from e (employment) to u (unemployment).
The left-hand vertical axis shows an index for c-u and n-u, while the right-hand shows an
index for u-c.
The other transition probabilities such as c-n, n-c, and u-n are not written here since both
Japan and the U.S. show similar movements. It is noted, however, that all the probabilities
in the U.S. are higher than those in Japan, as is true for the case of c-u, n-u and u-c.
Source:Higuchi, Seike and Hayami (1986). (original sources:Labour Force Survey,in Japan
andCurrent Population Survey,in the U.S.).
unemployed has been increasing since 1975 both in Japan and the U.S.
among female workers. In other words, the importance of discouraged
workers has declined recently in the two countries, and its decline is greater
in Japan.
Wakisaka (1986) made an important contribution by adopting the first
approach. He found that although it is true that the number of discouraged
female workers had increased until 1977, it has decreased considerably after
1977. The implication is that despite a fall in labour demand a large number
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they do? One group obviously continues to be unemployed, and seeks new
employment. This is one of the reasons why the rate of unemployment has
increased marginally in recent years.
Why do they stay unemployed recently? Several reasons may be raised.
First, as Higuchi (1982) pointed out, there has been an increasing trend in
the preference of working rather than not-working among women. Higuchi
estimated several parameters of a utility function which consist of leisure and
income, and obtained a strong preference of working by women. Married
women to supplement incomes of a family since the growth rate of their
husbands' income is low recently. Women tend to stay in the labour market
in order to seek an alternative job even if the job prospect is not bright.
Secondly, the effect of unemployment compensation must be considered. The
Japanese unemployment compensation system had been fairly generous, since
the financial condition has been healthy due to the lower rate of unemploy-
ment. As Tachibanaki (1984b) showed, a limited amount of prolongation of
the duration of unemployment was observed due mainly to generous support
by the unemployment compensation. This certainly encourages females to
stay in the labour market for a while even if they are going to retire from the
market later.
Another group can find employment not as full-time workers but as part-
time workers unwillingly. An increase in part-time workers, in particular
female part-timers, is a world-wide trend in many industrialized countries, as
the OECD study (1983) shows. Japan is not an exception to this trend. A
crucial result in Japan isthat a large number of part-time workers are
'involuntary' rather than voluntary.
Wakisaka (1986) estimated the number of female involuntary part-time
workers by examining various statistical sources. The definition of part-time
working is given as either (1) the total annual working days are less than
200, or (2) the weekly working hours are less than 35; the definition of
involuntary part-time workers is part-time workers who are seeking full-time
jobs, additional hours, or alternative jobs. Table 3 presents such figures. The
most important finding based on the two sources is that the growth rate of
involuntary part-time workers is very high, although some differences in
numbers are observed between the two sources. Currently, Japanese workers,
in particular female workers, are obliged to work as part-time employees
despite their desire to work on a full-time basis.
In summary, itis true that the effect of discouraged workers isstill
observed. The important difference, however, from the past experience, which
pushed a large number of the work force out of the labour market, must be
emphasized: a large number of involuntary part-time workers are being
produced recently. Needless to say, those two effects have contributed to
lower the rate of unemployment.
Is it possible to say that those two effects can be regarded as labour136 T Tachibanaki, Labour market flexibility in Japan, Europe and U.S.
Table 3
Estimated numbers of involuntary part-time workers (ten
thousands).
Employment Status Survey (Female only)
Year 1968 71 74 77 79 82
16.1 20.322.133.542.467.0
Labour Force Survey (Male and Female)
Year 197980 81 82 83 84
Male 16 17 20 20 22 18
Female 29 33 32 38 45 46
aEmployment Status Survey (every three years normally)
and Labour Force Survey (every year) are differentin
sampling method and especially in the definition of an
involuntary part-time worker. Employment Status Survey
definesitas a worker who has eitherless than two
hundred working days per year, or less than thirty-five
working hours per week on the average even if a person
worked for more than two hundred days a year, and who
wants to have an additional employment (or hours), or
wants to change employers. Labour Force Survey defines it
as a worker who has less than thirty-five working hours
per week in a specific week (i.e., the last week of March),
and who wants to have an additional employment (or
hours), or wants to change employers. In other words,
Employment Status Survey asks the usual status in a whole
year, while Labour Force Survey asks the status of a
specific week. In view of these definitions some differences
appear between them with respect to the estimated figures.
Source:Wakisaka (1986).
market flexibility which is desirable? Some economists believe that those
effects cannot be blamed for the following reasons. First, it it highly desirable
and probably a top priority to have a lower rate of unemployment even if
some other harmful effects are accompanied simultaneously. Secondly, those
discouraged workers are normally secondary workers whose economic con-
ditions are not severely penalized. The majority of discouraged people are
married women who can be supported by their husbands. I personally do
not share with those opinions. Thus, I do not evaluate the 'discouraged
effect' positively as flexibility. The dispute, however, has not been settled yet.
5. Labour mobility
Itis widely believed that the Japanese labour market stands out as
providing the longest duration of tenure and less frequent job mobility
among the OECD countries. Table 4 supports such a view. Japan has a
longer job tenure by about three or five years compared with the other
industrialized nations. As to labour turnover rates (including quits andT Tachibanaki, Labour market flexibility in Japan, Europe and U.S. 137
Table 4
Average current job tenures (years) and labour turnover rates (annual number of accessions (A)
and separations (S) per 100 employees, and annual quits (Q) and layoffs (L) per 100 employees).
Accessions and separations include turnovers at establishment level.
Quits and layoffs with asterisks are manual workers only, and Italy, Sweden and the U.S.
include mobility between establishments.
Quits and layoffs are for manufacturing industries.
The figure in parenthesis in the U.S. is layoff rate less the rate of recall of laid-off workers.
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 1984, and Technical Report MAS (85)25.
layoffs), only the U.S. has a high degree of labour turnover. Europe and
Japan have almost the same rate of labour turnover.
It is sometimes said that the duration of jobs is the longest in Japan
because Japanese firms provide their employees with lifetime employent
contracts. This is not true. First, there is no official commitment of lifetime
employment by both an employer and its employees. Only an implicit
understanding is operative between them. 'Desirable' is a proper word that
describes how both employers and employees feel about lifetime employment.
The effect of this implicit contract in terms of Baily (1974), Azariadis (1975)
or Okun (1981), or the agency theory in terms of Lazear (1981) may have a
great effect on the working of the labour market. It should be noted, how-
ever, that we observe a lot of discharges (or separations initiated by employers'
even in Japan despite this implicit understanding. Secondly, the coverage of
the lifetime employment as 'desirable' is rather limited; only about 30 percent
of employees are covered by this understanding. Moreover, in fact, a much
lower rate than 30 percent of workers commit themselves to lifetime employ-
ment according to the statistics. See Cole (1979) or Tachibanaki (1984a)
about this. Incidentally, the bigger a firm is or the higher the educational
and occupational attainment of the workers, the higher the probability of
lifetime employment. Female workers have been virtually excluded from it.
Thirdly, it should be emphasized that Japan is not unique in having longer
duration jobs. Hall (1982) suggested that near lifetime jobs are common even
in the U.S., after workers experience a high frequency of short spells of
Job tenures Labour turnover rates
Year All MaleFemale Year A S Q L
Austria (1982) 27 13
Canada (1983) 7.5 8.6 5.8
France (1978) 8.8 9.7 7.2 (1981) 16 17
W. Germany (1972) 8.5 8.9 5.7 (1982) 25 25
Italy (1972) 7.1 7.4 6.6 (1981) 9 15 11* 3*
Japan (1982) 11.7 13.5 8.8 (1983) 20 20 10 2
Sweden (1982) 15* 5*
U.K. (1979) 8.6 9.6 6.4 (1984) 19 21
U.S. (1983) 7.2 8.4 5.6 (1981) 39 41 24 17(6)138 T. Tachibanaki, Labour market flexibility in Japan, Europe and U.S.
employment during their younger ages.In sum, itisunreasonable to
emphasize the importance of lifetime jobs in interpreting the working of the
Japanese labour market.
The relationship between labour mobility (turnover) and unemployment is
briefly mentioned. More than 90 percent of labour turnovers in Japan are
held without having a status of unemployment, as Mizuno (1983) has stated.
Most Japanese employees do not experience unemployment when they
change employers. Although a smaller frequency of labour turnover makes
the rate of unemployment lower in general, the net effect in Japan is very
minor for the reason mentioned above.
How should we evaluate the high degree of labour turnover in the U.S.?
Although there are several merits and demerits, I find that this is not a
harmful phenomenon. For example, since more than 50 percent of workers
who are laid-off are recalled and return to their original employers, tem-
porary layoffs can be evaluated as buffers to cope with a fall in demand, and
can be regarded as a risk-sharing device by both employers and employees.
We showed that Japanese employers and employees used not only flexible
working hours as a risk-sharing device but also other practices. If the system
of unemployment compensation is prepared well, workers do not necessarily
worry about their economic hardships during temporarylayoffs.See
Feldstein (1975, 1976, 1978), Baily (1977) and Lilien (1980). Of course, the
adverse effect of the compensation system must be eliminated. As Medoff(1979)
has shown, it is possible to conjecture that unions in the U.S. prefer tem-
porary layoffs to more fluctuations in working hours and wage payments.
When a rigorous principle, like the seniority rule, is agreed upon, the cost of
the conflict due to temporary layoffs is minimized.
It must be noted, however, that the importance of short-spells of unem-
ployment has been challenged by several studies. For example, Clark and
Summers (1979) conclude that only a minor proportion of the aggregate
unemployment rate is explained by short spells of unemployment in the U.S.
Many countries in Europe also show that the proportion of the long-term
unemployed has increased in recent years. Thus, even in the U.S. my positive
evaluation of temporary layoffs may no longer be possible.
A troublesome aspect is voluntary quits and working at a different firm.
The traditional job search theory suggests that a worker will move to
another firm when he (or she) finds a job with a higher wage payment than
his (or her) reservation wage. A large number of American studies such as
Pencavel (1972), Stoikov and Raimon (1968), Bartel and Borjas (1981),
Mincer and Javanovic (1981), and many job search studies suggest that the
wage rate is one of the most important factors to explain quits, and that the
wage gain from quitting is positive although the gain becomes smaller for
older workers and frequent movers. Japanese studies suggest, however, that
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than their current wages, and that the great majority of them do not receive
higher wage payments than their 'reservation' wages, as shown by Tachibanaki
(1984b) and (1986). Ono (1981) presented an econometric study, proposing a
very minor effect of wages on voluntary quits. Japanese employees do not
change their employers to gain a possible increase in wage earnings but for
non-monetary incentives. In sum, there is an interesting contrast between the
U.S. and Japan with respect to the motivations of voluntary separations. It is
hard, however, to argue about which motivation is more flexible or rational
with respect to the performance of the labour market.
The most serious demerit of voluntary quits is a loss of specific human
capital, as Parsons (1972) pointed out. The quasi-rent shared by a firm,
represented by the difference between the worker's marginal value product
and the wage, must be lost by a quit. Although deferred payment such as a
private pension scheme or seniority wage payment can be considered as a
device to prevent such a loss, the loss may be bigger in the U.S. than in
Japan in view of more frequent quits in the U.S. as shown by table 4.
Probably, Japan shows the steepest age (seniority)-earning profile among the.
OECD countries. See fig. 3 the age-earning profiles in Japan, the U.K. and
the U.S. Perhaps, Japan's having the steepest growth rate of the wage by
seniority has contributed to preventing workers from voluntary separations,
as several theories of incentives to work or not to shirk, or of a reduction in
the uncertainty of future incomes of risk-averse workers proposed by Lazear
(1981), Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), and loannides and Pissarides (1985) suggest.
See Collier and Knight (1985) about a useful first step to initiate serious
empirical investigations.
Finally, it is noted that some degree of mobility (or turnover) is desirable
becauseitallocates the work-forces efficiently.In other words, human
resources are allocated smoothly, if the labour market has an environment of
flexible mobility. For example, one of the reasons for the big difference by
regions in the rate of unemployment in the U.K. is regional immobility of
workers. With respect to this, the American labour mobility, not only job
mobility but also regional mobility, can be evaluated positively. Also, such
an environment enables firms to adjust labour input easily, and thus
contributes to a better functioning of the labour market. It is not an easy
task, however, to define the optimal level of labour mobility.
6. Seriousness of Unemployment
There have been several attempts to estimate the degree of seriousness of
the rate of unemployment in Japan. Some believe that the official rate of
unemployment does not take account of the heterogeneity of the unemployed
people, and thatit does not indicate the seriousness of unemployment
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the degree of seriousness is estimated. For example, a middle-aged married
man with several children cannot be compared on a common basis with a
young unmarried man who is living with his parents even if those two
persons are unemployed. The literature on this is reviewed briefly.
There are two types of approaches for estimating the degree of seriousness
of unemployment. The first is to examine a particular group of workers (or
unemployed people) who are supposed to be much affected by unemploy-
ment. The second isto estimate the overall rate of unemployment by
assigning various weights to particular groups.
The first type is discussed. First, married men with several children may be
regarded as more serious compared with the other groups. Secondly, when
we focus on the reasons for becoming unemployed, job losers (i.e., unemploy-
ment due to involuntary separation) may be more serious compared with the
other motivations, for example voluntarily separated unemployed. Thirdly, if
skilled workers (experienced workers) are unemployed, the loss of human
resources at the national level may be greater in comparison to the case of
less-skilled workers. Fourth, an unemployed person with a longer duration of
unemployment may be suffering more compared with an unemployed with a
shorter duration. The above examples suggest that a particular aspect such
as (1) age, marriage or family status, (2) the reason for becoming unem-
ployed, (3) skill, or (4) duration of unemployment may be applied to examine
the seriousness of unemployment. Several economists have investigated this
problem by picking up one or two of the aspects mentioned above.
Yashiro (1983) presented his view, by using the first aspect, that since the
rate of unemployment by married adult male full-time workers (who may be
called 'core workers') was very low even during the stagflation and did not
fluctuate much, the seriousness of unemployment can be almost dismissed.
He implicitly assumed that an increasing trend in the rate of unemployment
of married women might not be serious since they are supported economi-
cally by their husbands, and that it would be sufficient if the policy authority
paid attention to only the movement of unemployment by the 'core workers'.
This opinion was criticized by the public, in particular several activists of
women's movements. In view of the fact that Japan adopted an equal
employment act between men and women quite recently, the majority of
people would accept an equal weight of unemployment between men and
women nowadays.
Koike (1984, 1986) made important contributions to the second and third
aspects, both focusing on unemployment due to involuntary separations and
skill differentials. He found two observations. First, there is a strong negative
correlation between a change in the number of unemployed people due to
involuntary separations and a change in the labour demand (the number of
job vacancies). This is more obvious for males than females. In this regard,a
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has a time lag of one quarter behind a change in business cycles. Secondly,
the majority of involuntary separations (mainly discharges) are middle-aged
or older workers in Japan, unlike in the U.K. and U.S. where the strict
seniority rule (the less tenured, the more likely discharged or laid-off, or last-
in first-out) is held. See Meadoff (1979), and Oswald (1982). The loss of per
capita human resources is greater in Japan than the other nations at least
with respect to involuntarily separated persons because workers with longer
tenures have more skills in general. Thus, so long as a loss of human
resources is concerned, the Japanese practice is less flexible than the British
or American practice. The seniority rule prevents the loss of skills of workers
accumulated at the firm, while the Japanese system encourages the loss of
more skills. This does not necessarily imply that the actual aggregate loss of
human resources in Japan is greater than in the U.K. or the U.S., since the
actual rate of involuntary separations in Japan is lower.
Going back to the story of the seriousness of unemployment, the second
type is reviewed. Several attempts have been made to estimate the real rate
of unemployment by calculating the weighted average of unemployment by
many groups. The second type includes all groups of workers, and calculates
the weighted average. A controversy involved is how to choose the base of
the weight. Several candidates are (1) income lost during unemployment, (2),
working hours lost, (3) the duration of unemployment, (4) heads of house-
holds or not, (5)skilllost,etc. In other fields, several attempts which
consider not only unemployment but also other aspects of the labour market
such as a change in employment, separation and others have been made.
Ohashi (1986), Tomita (1986), and Wakisaka (1986) contributed to this issue.
Two important observations were obtained by those studies. First, the
seriousness of unemployment calculated by the weighted average of all
unemployed people shows more fluctuations than the commonly used rate of
unemployment inthe time-series data. Secondly, several labour market
indexes which are constructed by taking account of a large number of
variables such as unemployment, employment, separation, vacancy and
others present closer correspondences with the change in the GDP. We
found before that no change in the rate of unemployment was observed
despite a dramatic fluctuation in the GDP. Thus, it may be concluded that
even the Japanese labour market would be sensitive to a change in the
output, if the labour market condition was measured properly. In other
words, the observed rate of unemployment is a poor indicator of the labour
market condition at least in Japan.
7. Concluding remarks
This article examined various aspects of labour market flexibility in Japan,
Europe and the U.S. with particular emphasis on Japan. Labour adjustment,142 T. Tachibanaki, Labour market flexibility in Japan, Europe and U.S.
wages and labour demand, labour cost, labour supply, labour mobility,
seriousness of unemployment and other aspects were examined, and then
compared between Japan and the Euro-American countries. It was found
that Japan has flexibility in some areas, while rigidity also is observed in
other areas.In some cases,flexibility does not contribute to a better
performance of the labour market. Also, some sacrifices or costs are paid
occasionally in order to achieve flexibility in those areas. Thus, itis not
possible to propose that labour market flexibilityisalways evaluated
positively. We have to be careful about introducing labour market flexibility
from one country to another country without examining the impact on the
labour market and macroeconomy since it may hurt a better aspect in
another country. Incidentally, I believe that the main reason for the better
performance of the Japanese macroeconomy, if any, is due not to labour
market flexibility but to elements other than the working of the labour
market, although I have not argued this point at all. I do not deny, however,
that labour market flexibility, especially flexible working hours due mainly to
overtime hours and the other flexibilities, was effective in minimizing the
fluctuation of the rate of unemployment.
Finally, it is noted that the rate of unemployment is a poor indicator of
the labour market condition in Japan for the following reasons. First, the
rateof unemploymentisconsiderablyunderestimatedbecauseof the
existence of discouraged workers. And secondly, a considerable degree of
fluctuation is observed in response to a change in output when the index for
the labour market condition is measured appropriately, unlike the rate of
unemployment.
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COMMENTS
'Labour Market Flexibility in Japan in Comparison with Europe and the U.S.'
by T. Tachibanaki
Richard LAYARD
I am not an expert on Japan, so I will base my remarks on some of the
stylised facts which emerge from this interesting and informative paper. There
seem to me to be three major questions.
Why does unemployment fluctuate so little in Japan?
Why is unemployment so low in Japan?
How serious is unemployment in Japan?
Low fluctuations in unemployment
In comparison with other countries, Japan seems to rank as follows, in
terms of the variability of
output high
worker-hours average




These remarks relate to the standard deviation of the detrended logarithm of
each variable, and are based on table 1, as well as Gordon (1982) and
Wadhwani (1985).R. Layard, Comments on the Tachibanaki paper 147
The first finding, on output, is important becauseitcasts doubt on
Weitzman's thesis that it is profit-sharing which is stabilising employment. In
a pure profit-sharing economy, output would be stable as well as employ-
ment [Wadhwani (1987)]. The reason why Japanese employment is stable is
not that shocks have no effect on output. As Wadhwani shows, they do, as
much as elsewhere. The difference is that in Japan the fluctuation in output is
mainly absorbed by fluctuation in hours per worker. This must be due to
implicit contracts, which are felt to be more important in Japan and are
reflected in longer job durations. The less generous availability of social
security may be another reason why lay-offs are avoided. So we get high
fluctuation of hours per worker. When hours per worker vary there are high
returns to scale (Feldstein, 1968), and this 'explains' how output can be so
variable relative to worker-hours. Finally, unemployment varies less than
employment due to the fact that the labour force is pro-cyclical, with
discouraged secondary and temporary workers leaving in recessions.
As regards real earnings, these vary a lot; and this is the mechanism which
helps to stabilise employment. After an adverse productivity shock (or an
import price rise) employment has only to fall a little to generate a big fall in
real wages. This is enough to restore employment. This process was outlined
at an earlier ISOM meeting (Grubb, Jackman and Layard (1983) and has
since been beautifully displayed in Newell and Symons (1985).
The author however questions the Phillips curve relation underlying this
interpretation. He implies that, if unemployment varies little and real wages a
lot, one is bound to get the impression that small changes in employment
cause large changes in real wages, even if they do not. The argument is
wrong. If the variance of unemployment is low, it is all the more impressive
that one can detect its influence with a significant t-statistic in a Phillips
curve. There is further evidence that we are measuring a genuine response of
wages to the labour market. If in the Phillips curve the independent variable
is log vacancies (rather than unemployment), its effect is twice as high in
Japan as anywhere else and highly significant [Johnson and Layard (1986)].
Thus Japanese unemployment fluctuates little for three reasons: due to
implicitcontracts hours fluctuate a lot;the labour force moves with
employment; and wages respond a lot.
Low level of unemployment
The low level of Japanese unemployment is a different issue (except to the
extent that theeffectof shocks are perpetuated by hysteresis). What
institutional features could explain the low Japanese NAIRU?
A starting point is the observation in the paper that employment is
roughly148 R. Layard, Comments on the Tachibanaki paper
permanent employees 40per cent
temporary employees 30 per cent
self-employed 30 per cent
For temporary employees we have a labour market which roughly clears. So
the problems which arise from institutional wage pressure are confined to 40
per cent of the market. In addition, lay-offs are not by inverse seniority, so
that those who control the union are not themselves immune from the
employment effects of the wage bargain. Moreover the percentage unionised
in Japan is low by world standards. So we have an economy where
institutional wage pressure is a less all-absorbing problem, with a big self-
employed sector providing an alternative outlet for those who might be
unemployed in a pure wage-system. In addition the self-employed sector is a
source of additional labour and thus prevents overheating when the modern
sector expands, just as in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s workers moved
from agriculture to the towns and prevented overheating of the urban labour
market.
Social security too may play a role. Benefits run out after a year for long-
term workers and much quicker for those with shorter work histories. This
helps to prevent the build-up of long-term unemployment. Finally, there has
been, until recently, the high rate of productivity growth, which is a
wonderful oiler of the wheels and mollifier of the struggle for income shares.
It will be very interesting to see whether Japanese unemployment remain so
low, as productivity growth abates.
How serious is Japanese unemployment?
The author speculates about how serious Japanese unemployment is. My
own view isthat relative to other countries itis no more serious than
appears from the crude (and amazingly low) figures. The author suggests
otherwise. He suggests that there are large numbers of discouraged workers,
and others who are rationed to part-time rather than full-time work. Both
these facts matter but they do not matter anything like as much as people
who are actively looking for full-time work and have none.
To measure the cost of unemployment to an individual one should
evaluate the welfare triangle that (s)he losses by not being able to work as
many annual hours as (s)he would choose. The cost (relative to annual
income) is approximately proportional to d2/, where d is the fraction of
desired hours for which unemployed andjis the elasticity of supply of
annual hours [Layard (1981)]. Since the amount of unemployment the
individual experiences is measured by d, the average seriousness of each unit
of unemployment is proportional to d/. It is worse the lower the supplyJ. Mairesse, Comments on the Tachibanaki paper 149
elasticity and the longer the duration. Discouraged workers must have high
supply elasticities, as have some married women seeking work. Most married
men have low supply elasticities, which is why their unemployment is
particularly inefficient. It is good that Japan has so little of it.It is also
excellent that Japanese unemployment is so relatively short. Youth unem-
ployment of 4.5 percent is not so good, since that has effects on the supply of
skill and work attitudes. But Japanese economists need not leanover
backwards to disparage their own garden. Everything there may not be
perfect, but most of us would willingly change it for our own.
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COMMENTS
'Labour Market Flexibility in Japan in Comparison with Europe and the U.S.'
by T. Tachibanaki
Jacques MAIRESSE
Toshiaki Tachibanaki's survey paper is an effort to analyse the various
dimensions of 'labour market flexibility' in Japan in a comparativeperspec-
tive. It is particularly interesting and valuable since he has directaccess to
the recent booming literature by Japanese economists (in Japanese)on this
topic. The issue of labour market flexibility, however, raises various defi-
nitional problems and there are many aspects to it. For a shortsurvey the
subject may be in fact too wide. Given this large scope of histopic,
Tachibanaki has done a good job, and one, who is not an expert on either
Japan or labour markets, learns a great deal from reading his paper.150 J.Mairesse, Comments on the Tachibanaki paper
I shall restrict my comments to giving a general feeling and underlying
observations, and Ishall end on a couple of more specific econometric
considerations.
Like other Japanese economists, it seems that Tachibanaki is inclined to
somehow minimize or downplay thedifferences between the Japanese
economy and the European and U.S. economies. A priori I am sympathetic
to his attitude, and I am quite willing to believe that a number of such
differences are not well established or very important, and that they have
been overstressed. However, in reading his paper, I have the strong feeling
that even if the Japanese economy does not differ in many respects from the
western economies more than they do between themselves, the society at
large (i.e., the social environment, the behavioural rules and values) is indeed
very different. To the extent that there is a definite westernization process of
the cultural attitudes and beliefs of the Japanese people (as Tachibanaki
suggests in some ways) there seems to be still a very long way to go.
At a general level, the issue of labour market flexibility can be viewed as
one of a compromise (or a trade off) between social and economic targets
(or social and economic constraints). Enforcing social guaranties and rights
for the workers imposes restrictions and rigidities for the operation and
management of the firms. Conversely trying to improve the flexibility and
efficiency of the labour market, in order to accommodate economic pressures
and to cope with economic crises, leads to the loosening or abandonment of
social advantages. In this respect, one finds in Tachibanaki's paper an
impressive list of more or less socially rooted differences between Japan and
most European countries and between Japan and the U.S. Let us go over
this list rapidly.
(1)The extreme flexibility of labour force participation or the existence of a
large number of discouraged workers, mainly women. On this point, one may
remember the startling figure given in the Hamada and Kurosaka paper
presented in this conference three years ago.1 In Japan between 1973 and
1975, after the first oil shock, the number of men and women who were
discouraged and went out of the 'labour force' increased by 350,000 and
840,000 respectively, while the number of those who stayed as officially
unemployed increased only by 220,000 and 100,000 respectively. The esti-
mates cited in the present paper give a similar picture. While the official
unemployment rate was 2.2 percent in Japan in 1978 as against 6.0 percent
in the U.S., 8.9 percent of workers (among those out of the 'labour force')
were discouraged in Japan as against 1.4 percent only in the U.S. If we
assume that the proportion of discouraged workers was the same in Japan as
in the U.S. (and if we take the average rate of labour force participation to
be 0.65 in Japan2), the rate of unemployment would also be about the same
'Hamada and Kurosaka (1984). Reference given by Tachibanaki.
2OECD Economic Studies, 'Japan', 1986 (Table 25).J. Mairesse, Comments on the Tachibanaki paper 151
in the two countries. Even if the importance of discouraged workers has been
declining recently in Japan, there is still a striking difference with the U.S.
and I think with most European countries.
The existence of an increasing number of involuntary part-time workers,
mainly women. Apparently these are taking the place of discouraged workers
in recent years.
The relative importance of lay offs of middle aged or older workers,or
their relegations to subsidiaries companies, in spite of (or in part because of)
the Nenko seniority wage system, and in spite of the existence of lifetime
employment implicit contracts for the more qualified fraction of the labor
force in the large firms.
The fact that half of the workers who are said to quit voluntarily their
positions had to accept lower wages in their new jobs.
The high level of total annual working hours in Japan relative to the
western countries: 2,152 hours in 1983 as against 1,898 in the U.S. and 1,657
in France.
The relative weakness of labour unions as compared to Europe.
The low level of unemployment compensation.
The general fact that employment protection laws are less stringent than
in Europe.
The fact that minimum wages vary widely by regions, and are not well
enforced.
The fact also that the 'Equal Employment and Treatment Act' is recent
in Japan and has no penalty provisions.
The low cost of the social security (health and pensions programs) for
the Japanese firms, until now, as compared to their European counterparts.
One must admit that taken together this list of differences is impressive. Of
course the problem for us is whether these differences matter much for the
working of the economy as a whole, and to what extent theycan explain the
remarkable Japanese economic performances, specially in the last decade, in
comparison to the other industrial countries? More specifically the question
is how are these differences reflected in the main equations ofour simple
macro-models?
My econometric remarks concern precisely the specification of thewage
and labour demand equationsinsuch a model.Iquiteagree with
Tachibanaki's criticism about the estimation of the 'Phillips curve' in Japan,
and for the same reasons about that of the 'Okun's law'. Since the official
rate of unemployment varies very little, due mainly to the existence ofa pool
of 'discouraged workers', one has to deal with a particular type oferrors in
variables problem. One way to go about it is to adopt an unofficial rate of
unemployment, adding back the discouraged workers, or a fraction of them,
to the officially unemployed workers. With such a correction, we can expect
that the estimated elasticity of the wage relative to unemploymentor that ofI 52 J. Mairesse, Comments on the Tachibanaki paper
the output gap (Okun's coefficient) would go down for Japan and would fall
closer in line with the orders of magnitude found for the other countries.
A similar problem arises with the estimation of the elasticity of labour
relative to output, either in terms of the number of employees or in terms of
total hours of work. Output fluctuations, even after detrending, are much
larger in Japan than in the other countries (see Tachibanaki, table 1, panel
B). A great part of these fluctuations, however, may be transitory, while in a
proper specification of labour demand equations the permanent or expected
changes of output should be the main determinants. If this specification
problem is not taken into account, the labour elasticities will be under-
estimated. Besides the various explanations given by Tachibanaki, this may
be one important reason why the adjustment of employment appears to be
relatively slow and rigid in Japan.